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ABSTRACT - The recent financial crisis resulted destructive effects on finance industry. Islamic financial 
industry (IFI) is still naïve and largely untested in the face of a major financial turmoil. Major issues and 
uncertainties of the insolvency of IFI include the issue of moral hazard, government bailouts, excessive 
risk taking and deposit insurance. This paper addresses the issue of crisis management in IFI from the 
perspective of al-Siyasah al-Shar’iyyah and attempt to derive public policy guidelines that are useful in 
developing a timely and efficient crises management framework for Islamic finance industry. By using 
qualitative methods, the study found that the global financial crisis resulted in great destruction of 
financial institution. Although Islamic finance was quite immune to the global crisis as compared to its 
conventional peer, concerns still exist. It is time that Islamic finance industry learns from the financial 
woes of the rest of the world. 
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ABSTRAK - Krisis keuangan baru-baru ini mengakibatkan efek destruktif pada industri keuangan. 
Industri keuangan Islam (IKI) masih naif dan sebagian besar belum teruji dalam menghadapi gejolak 
keuangan besar. Isu utama dan ketidakpastian dari kebangkrutan IKI meliputi moral hazard, dana 
talangan pemerintah, pengambilan risiko yang berlebihan dan asuransi deposito. Makalah ini membahas 
isu manajemen krisis dalam IKI dari perspektif al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah dan berusaha mendapatkan 
pedoman kebijakan publik yang bermanfaat dalam mengembangkan kerangka kerja manajemen krisis 
yang tepat waktu dan efisien bagi IKI. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif, studi ini menemukan 
bahwa krisis keuangan global mengakibatkan kehancuran besar bagi industri keuangan. Meskipun 
keuangan Islam cukup kebal terhadap krisis global dibandingkan dengan keuangan konvensional, 
kekhawatiran masih ada. Sudah saatnya industri keuangan Islam belajar dari krisis keuangan dari 
seluruh dunia. 
Kata Kunci: Hukum Islam, Krisis Keuangan Global, Kebijakan Publik dan Sadd al-Dharai 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whether inspired by the sincere desire to fulfill the religious obligations of the 
Muslim population or an ingenious marketing tactic, Islamic finance has 
successfully emerged as a viable alternative or, at minimum, a complement to 
conventional finance. Regardless of its true intention in inception, the 
development of Islamic finance is crucial indeed. It evidences the fact that 
there is no separation between spiritual and mundane in Islam. The Shariah, i.e. 
Islamic Law, is a code of conduct that, apart from its catering for the spiritual 
needs, encompasses all social, political, legal, and economic aspects of the 
Muslims’ lives. Hence, they are required to adhere to the Shariah commands in 
their economic endeavors, which include, but are not limited to, refraining 
from the major prohibited activities of riba (interest), gharar (grave 
uncertainty), maysir (high speculation), and jahl (ignorance). Profit and loss 
sharing, profit based on readiness to take risk, and all transactions backed by an 
asset are also among the unanimously accepted features of Islamic finance.  
Although Islamic banks have come out of the sub-prime and credit crunch in 
better shape than many of their conventional counterparts, banks do fail from 
time to time, and eventually an Islamic bank will too. This prospect raises 
some important issues because the bulk of Islamic banking is a voyage into the 
realm of unknown, including the consequences of a downfall. However, the 
recent financial crisis has brought this issue to the full front. As country after 
country in the advance economy was hit by it, the stakeholders in Islamic 
finance were automatically alarmed about any such scenario faced by Islamic 
finance in the near future. There are many questions that need to be answered. 
At the front of these questions is the possible response of the regulator in times 
of such crisis. Since Islamic finance is concerned with Shariah compliance, this 
kind of compliance has to be maintained in times of policy making and policy 
decision related to crisis management.  
However, since Islamic finance has thus far been safe from any severe crisis, 
there is a lack of certainty as to how would such a crisis be managed in the 
future. But conventional financial system has been through many such crises; it 
has leant some good lessons from its past experiences and has forgotten many 
others. Thus, Islamic finance has the chance to benefit from all the good that 
can be offered by conventional and avoid what had made conventional finance 
suffer most. The objective of this paper is to draw such lesson as a roadmap for 
Islamic finance in terms of effective crises management. In addition, it is 
argued that one classical Islamic institution known as al-hisbah can also help 
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in making Islamic finance well prepared for any disastrous situation in the 
future.  
In detail the objective of the paper are: (1) To determine the most important 
facts and episodes of global financial crisis, (2) To highlight the causes of the 
crisis and the factors responsible on it, (3) To see the interconnectedness of al-
hisbah with crisis related regulations in Islamic finance, (4) To suggest how 
Islamic finance can handle better with such situation in the future and (5) To 
recommend future directions to the policy makers. 
The structure of this paper consists of three section. Section one discusses the 
global financial crisis in 2007-2008. The causes and consequences as well as 
the damages of this event are briefly highlighted. The next section is an 
overview of the classical Islamic institution of al-hisbah and its connectedness 
and importance in the sphere of finance and business. This section briefly 
introduces the principles of sadd al-dharai, masalihmursalah, and legal 
maxims of Shariah. Section three outlines the important lessons that can be 
learnt by Islamic finance from the global financial crisis. These lessons can 
help regulators and policy makers adopt the most suitable approach to crisis 
management. The paper ends with a brief conclusion. 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
In line with these objectives, the study follows qualitative methodology of 
research which suits the nature of the topic. There is no quantitative data 
required for it since the directive and objective is to help in policy and decision 
making. The relevant literature to global financial crisis is analyzed and the 
most important lessons, causes and future course of action are detected. The 
institution of al-hisbah is also explored as it matches regulatory and public 
policy essence. On the basis of these facts, the possible public policy direction 
for Islamic finance is arrived at.  
DISCUSSION  
BACKGROUND TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS  
Literature has sufficiently analyzed the panicky financial episodes of the past; 
but the bulk of it is related to the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 which has 
analyzed almost each aspect of it. The stage for financial crisis was set by large 
complex financial institutions (LCFIs) through “(1) originating high risk 
loans… and (2) pooling these loans to create securities that could be sold to 
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investors” (Wilmarth, 2011). But this was not the end of the story; “with the 
blessing of regulators”, LCFIs were allowed securitization through which they 
reduced their apparent risk and, consequently, lower their capital requirements 
by creating structured finance securities. These securities consisted of a variety 
of products matching the demand of customers according to their risk and 
return appetite, including: asset backed securities (ABS), residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS). This was the first level of securitization which was followed by the 
second layer of securitization including: collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
and (corporate) leveraged buyouts (LBOs). There was a third layer of 
securitization in the form of “CDOs-squared”. The risk of securitization was 
intensified through over the counter (OTC) credit derivatives called credit 
default swaps (CDS) which was equal to insurance in the event of default. The 
financial system’s risk exposure was further enhanced through synthetic CDOs 
(Wilmarth, 2011).  
According to an estimate by IMF, private-sector financial institutions issued 
about $15 trillion of ABS, MBS, and CDOs in global markets between 2000 
and 2007, including $9 trillion issued in the United States and, as per a second 
study, $11 trillion of structured-finance securities were outstanding in the U.S. 
market in 2008 (Wilmarth, 2011). This sway of securitization motivated 
lenders to provide more credit to the borrowers without looking into their 
credit history (Leicht & Fitzgerald, 2007). What added to the gravity of the 
situation was the government’s decision not to regulate the securities’ market. 
However, concerns were raised regarding the substantial risk that was involved 
in securities and which was difficult to evaluate. The financial crisis was born 
from the gradual development of institutions that encouraged opportunities for 
risk taking without enough institutional checks against such behavior (J. L. 
Campbell, 2011). Nevertheless, the champions of deregulation dominated the 
scene and even if efforts were made to control the situation, they were to no 
avail.  
However, once there was a decline in the housing prices starting from late 
2006 as a result of subprime mortgages, customers began to default on their 
loans and the effect spread across the finance industry. Large mortgage 
companies in US like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken by government. 
The collateral damage caused by both mortgage backed and asset-backed 
securities was unprecedented. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brother added fuel to 
the fire. Among the great giants that succumbed or almost succumbed to this 
situation was American International Group which almost collapsed. Since its 
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failure would cause other institutions fall, the government provided an $85 
billion loan in exchange for a 79.9% equity stake in the company—a bailout 
that eventually totaled $182 billion by March 2009 (J. L. Campbell, 2011). 
Financial Liberalization 
An important episode before the global financial crisis was a sway of 
deregulation of the market and one of the most important changes before the 
financial crisis was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which was 
introduced then to mitigate opportunism as well as excessive risk taking by the 
banking industry. These two were the considered the causes of the Great 
Depression. However, it was replaced by the Financial Services Modernization 
Act- a politically driven legislation- in 1999 in order to enable banks to 
compete efficiently in the international market (Stiglitz, 2003). This act freed 
many markets from the regulation of government. Especially, it terminated 
regulatory oversight from credit default swap which had a market of $60 
trillion world-wide by late 2008 (Morgan, 2008).  
Financial services mergers occurred at a massive scale (J. L. Campbell, 2011) 
and ultimately “shadow banking system” grew rapidly. This banking system 
did not accept deposits like commercial banks do. Therefore, they were not 
bound by the same safety regulations as other traditional banks were, like the 
requirement for capitalization (Wolf, 2009). Further deregulation followed in 
2004 when capital requirements were further eased, making credit availability 
much easy. It was allowed now to shift capital from safer to riskier and more 
profitable investments. Previously, a fixed percentage of each dollar of capital 
had to be reserved by securities’ firms to ensure safeguard in case of collapse. 
However, now these firms were allowed to use non-cash assets like asset-
backed securities to avoid this risk. This made more money available for use as 
collateral to borrow money. The leverage ratio before this change was 12-1 
which reached a peak of 33-1 after this change in policy (Blinder, 2009). 
Several other reforms in securities markets assisted each other to create further 
incentives for more risky investment behavior. All this meant that that credit 
flowed easily and excessively than before especially to the housing market. 
The opponents of regulations succeeded in their argument that they hinder the 
efficiency of these new and lucrative markets (J. L. Campbell, 2011).  
The availability and ease of loans is indeed the tool which was utilized and 
which led to the gloomy financial landscape of 2007-2008. This was made 
possible due to the financial innovation which was much boosted upon before 
the crisis but which was nothing more than a second name for issuing more and 
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more debt. As John Kenneth Galbraith expresses it: “financial innovation is 
simply another way to issue debt” (Samwick, 2009). In the case Northern Rack 
bank of UK, the result of this financial innovation was that customers could 
borrow 125 percent of their property value and up to six times their annual 
income: the boring days when customers could borrow only 75 percent of their 
property value and a maximum of three times their income were over (Dowd, 
2009).  
The modern risk management tools and practices used by risk management 
practitioners are based on unreal assumptions: “they assume that financial risks 
follow Gaussian distributions (and so ignore the “fat tails” which really 
matter); they assume that correlations are constant (and ignore the fact that 
correlations tend to radicalize in crises and so destroy the portfolio 
diversification on which a risk management strategy might be predicated) and 
they make assumptions about market liquidity that break down when they are 
most needed (Dowd, 2009). Accordingly, the risk involved in the era of 
financial innovation were hidden, or even misunderstood until it was late to 
return and fix the matters.  
Taleb (2010) blames the unrealistic theories, models and tools used by the 
economic establishment cheatingly. He said that it is surprisingly the 
economics establishment should have been aware of the use the wrong tools 
and complete fiasco in the theories, but they kept pushing the warnings under 
the rug, or hiding their responses. The inadequacy of economic theories to 
explain the causes of run is expressed by Ayotte   (2009) that economic 
theories can explain the consequences of panic runs when they occur, but they 
do not explain what triggers them in the first place. The dangers of 
macroeconomic models are explained by Leijonhfvud (2014) that 
macromodels that ignore problems of instability are dangerous to the health 
and welfare of untold millions of people. The same writers further hints 
towards the inadequacy of another model by concluding that my personal 
conclusion is that Walrasian equilibrium models are hopelessly inadequate for 
dealing with financial crises and their aftermaths. 
To conclude, there were numerous factors responsible for the downfall of 
economies in 2007-2008. The factors responsible for crisis include regulators, 
corporate governance and risk management, excessive borrowing, government 
failure, ethical failure, mortgage-lending and securitization, derivatives and 
rating agencies. However, if there was one factor generating all these sources 
of failure, it was ‘moral hazard’ alone.  A moral hazard is where one party is 
responsible for the interests of another, but has an incentive to put his or her 
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own interests first: the standard example is a worker with an incentive to shirk 
on the job (Dowd, 2009).  The principal incentive problem is moral hazard. 
Moral hazard is the familiar concern that someone who is protected against the 
consequences of a risk has less incentive to take precautions against the risk 
(Ayotte & Skeel., 2009). Moral hazard in finance world can take place in many 
shapes such as a person may sell another person a financial product, like a 
mortgage, with the knowledge that it is against the interest of the buyer.  He 
may pay himself huge bonuses from the funds that he manages on behalf of 
others. He may take risks the consequences of which are born by others. 
According to Dowd (2009), the most fundamental reason for the failure of risk 
management is economic in nature, there is strong incentive to take risk which 
leads to risk taking ultimately. In such scenario, risk management is like “war 
on drugs” which helps curing the disease but it can never win conclusively. No 
matter how prudent risk managers are, they are prone to orders from senior 
management, pressurized to take short cuts, produce lower risk number to 
decrease capital requirements and are, thus, not willing to rock the boat. In 
addition, if senior management itself is fed on remuneration package that 
induce excessive risk-taking, the result is not difficult to guess.  
As elaborated above, it is moral hazard that laid at the foundation of all that 
happened before and during the financial crisis are: excessive risk taking, debt 
creation in the name of financial engineering, multi-layers of securitization, 
financial liberalization and deregulation and billions of bailouts and assistance 
from the taxpayers’ money. However, the question worth pondering is that 
what causes this moral hazard which is the root of all problems in this case? 
According to Dowd (2009) The root problem is limited liability, which allows 
investors and executives the full upside benefit of their risk-taking, while 
limiting their downside exposure. Since modern corporations are founded on 
the notion of legal personality and limited liability, the parties involved in the 
financial market are aware of the mechanism of reaping its fruit. Campbell and 
Griffin (2006) said that rightly opine on this situation that one has to stretch the 
point to say that the executives of large public companies are exposed to the 
economic risks of failure in any significant way, and certainly they are more or 
less completely cocooned from the most fundamental market pressure, fear of 
personal bankruptcy.  
The root of the problem of limited liability is highlighted by Ho and Price 
(2011:25) in these words, the surprisingly tenacious mythology in Salomon v 
Salomon, that a company is a separate person whose liabilities are not 
necessarily shouldered by its proprietors, while promoting investment in 
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situations where there might be none, is also the prime cause of moral hazard 
in the global financial system.  However, what the writers attribute here to 
limited liability is sensed long ago by Adam Smith when he criticized 
corporations. 
What the writers mentioned above argue about can be summarized with the 
help of a simple tree diagram as below:  
Diagram 1. An Anatomy of the Global Financial Crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram is clear in essence. Although the sequencing may be changed if 
viewed from a different perspective, it is generally agreed that the problem 
starts when liability of parties involved in any transaction or market is limited. 
It directly leads to the issue of moral hazard that is further exhibited in 
different forms or branches. However, on the tops of all is the issue of deposit 
insurance. Ample of literature has elaborated how moral hazard is magnified 
by deposit insurance. It has been argued that financial institutions, especially 
banks, have unique prudential regulations like explicit insurance deposit 
guarantees. Whereas these guarantees are to make sure the stability of the 
system and avoid bank runs, they induce moral hazard problem in ex ante 
sense, i.e. before the failure of bank. Due to such implicit guarantee by 
governments, moral hazard is also created in the ex post sense after the banks 
have become or near to insolvency (Marinc & Vlahu, 2012). It hardly needs 
any argument that it is deposit insurance that makes depositors indifferent 
towards the performance and stability of the banks, since they are sure of the 
safety of their deposits. In addition, banks are also induced to take as much risk 
     Zada, Lahsasna, & Saleem | Effective Crisis Management For Islamic Finance Industry_ 
SHARE | Volume 5 | Number 1| January - June 2016 
 
 
9 
as they can in order to increase value for their shareholders and ensure their 
personal bonuses etc. Indeed, deposit insurance is one of the major reasons that 
contributed to the collapse in 2007-2008.  
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT: HISBAH, 
MASALIHMURASALAH AND SADD AL-DHARAI 
Market Regulation in the Earliest Islamic Era 
Even though small and simple, market was regulated in the early Islamic 
period by the Prophet peace be upon him and the four pious Caliphs, may 
Allah be pleased with them all. Numerous instances can be quoted in this 
regard. Theoretically, the Prophet peace be upon him stressed “individual” 
accountability in these words: “Beware that every one of you is a shepherd and 
everyone is answerable with regard to his folk. The caliph is a shepherd over 
the people and shall be questioned about them. A woman is a guardian over the 
house hold of her husband and his children and has to be questioned about 
them. A slave is a shepherd over the property of his master and shall be 
questioned about it”. Then he, may peace be upon him, adds: “beware that 
every one of you is a guardian and every one of you shall be questioned with 
regard to his trust”. The words of this hadith explicitly make each individual 
responsible for his/her subordinates. Thus, it is a manifestation of both 
individual and “institutional” or “organizational” responsibility in which those 
in charge of some task or some persons are responsible for their duties towards 
them accordingly.  
Dost (undated) argues that the institution of “hisbah” that is to be found in the 
later Islamic era was inspired by the practice of the Prophet peace be upon him, 
as he used to visit the market personally and check on the accuracy of 
measures. The Prophet also assigned specific places to different mongers and 
prohibited different market practices like meeting the producer-farmer at the 
entrance of the city before they reached the market, fearing they may sell at 
lower price. The Prophet peace be upon him was also opposed to price fixation 
at the time of scarcity when he replied those who complained high prices and 
requested to fix it: “the seller and the buyer, the one who provides and who 
fixes the prices are nobody but the God. I don’t wish to die whilst people 
having demands of life and property from me”.  
This conduct of the Prophet peace be upon him was taken as a role model and 
followed by the four Caliphs after him. In this regard, the first Caliph of Islam, 
Abu Bakkar, may Allah be pleased with him used to keep a check on his 
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collectors when they leave for their task or return from it. Thus, he asked Muaz 
ibn Jabal may Allah be pleased with him, to give account of what he had done. 
He replied, are we subject to two accounts, one towards Allah and the other 
towards you? However, he did as he was directed by the Caliph. Usmani 
(Usmani, 1414 H) narrates an incident of the practical supervision of Umar 
may Allah be pleased with him. Once he was on a visit to the market where he 
found that a person was selling something at a lower than the market price. 
Watching this, he ordered that person: “Either you increase in price, or go 
away from our market.” It has also been narrated that it was the habit of Umar 
may Allah be pleased with him to patrol in the market of Medina with his 
durrah in his hand and would guide those who needed correction (Shahatah, 
1999). 
What the above instances show is that keeping a proper check and balance on 
the market of that time was considered an important task by the Prophet and 
his followers. Their personal interest in the issue reveal that disciplining the 
prevalent business practices of their respective time, though these may be of a 
small scale, held serious importance in their opinion. This consequently led to 
the establishment of the institution of hisbah in the Islamic realm. This 
institution and position of muhtasib will be discussed below. 
The Institution of Hisbah and Duties of Muhtasib 
Keeping in view the aforementioned examples from the earliest Islamic era, a 
separate institution for market supervision was established later which was 
called hisbah. This institution was formed based on the Islamic concept of “al 
amr bil maroof wal nahyu anil munkar” i.e. (the task of) enjoining what is right 
and forbidding what is evil. This is an essential feature of a given Islamic 
society and Quran stresses upon the establishment of this institution, either by 
the state or by the community members themselves. In fact Quran declares this 
task to be the sole purpose and duty of the Muslim Ummah: “You are the best 
Ummah ever raised for mankind. You bid the Fair and forbid the Unfair, and 
you believe in Allah.” Based on these Quranic injunctions, hisbah has been 
defined as a religious institution under the authority of the state that appoint 
people to carry out the responsibility of enjoining what is right, whenever 
people start to neglect it and forbidding what is wrong, whenever people start 
to engage in it (Yaacob & Donglah, 2012). This definition is broader enough to 
include both financial and non-financial obligation of a muhtasib, the person in 
charge of performing this duty.  
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In its strict financial and business sense, the duty of muhtasib was to ensure 
that the daily business transactions are done in a manner that is not harming the 
society (Rahim & al, 2012). The major responsibility of muhtasib was to 
ensure that the business practices prevalent in the market are in accordance 
with Islamic injunctions and each party is getting its due rights as well as 
performing its duties. It is not an exaggeration to state that the current day 
“regulator” has the same task to perform as was done by the classical muhtasib, 
although a regulators role is restricted to the extent of monitoring that 
everything in the financial markets is according to the regulations whereas 
muhtasib concentrated on the physical inspection of the market. This change is 
the direct outcome of the changes that have taken place in the business 
structure during the course of the centuries.  
The classical Muslim writer, Al-Mawardi (450 AH), has elaborated the duties 
of muhtasib in his famous book al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya. In fact he has devoted 
a full chapter of his book for this purpose which he titled as al-hisbah. The 
writer starts with outlining in detail the nine differences between a muhtasib 
and a person who performs the task of “enjoining the good and forbidding 
evil.” Regarding the conditions of muhtasib, Al-Mawardi (450 AH) opines that 
he should be free, just, of sound judgment, firm in religion, and be aware of 
what evil is.. He then elaborates how this institution lies in between two other 
institutions: the judiciary and the court of grievances. This is followed by a 
detailed description of the duties of muhtasib which the writer categorizes into 
two broader categories first: commanding the good and forbidding the evil. 
Commanding the good is further classified by him into three types and 
forbidding the evil into three types alike, each with its detailed rulings and 
ample examples.  
A muhtasib would hear cases related to different aspects. However, the 
financial matters dealt by him included: (1) Weights and measures, (2) 
Adulteration, (3) Supervision of certain sensitive professions and (4) Checking 
public places for proper maintenance or removing obstructions in the market 
(Niazi, 1991). Some duties that the writer assigns to the muhtasib include the 
prevention of contract or practices that is totally prohibited by Shariah, e.g. 
usury etc. He must also denounce any fraudulent practices in the market that 
harm any of the bargaining parties. Of supreme importance is the duty of 
muhtasib is to prevent the practice of giving short measures. To do this, he 
should test and control the market weights and measures appropriately and may 
even use a stamp of his own to ensure a single standard practice in the whole 
market. Al-Mawardi (450 AH) argues that if the jurisdiction of inspection is 
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large enough, the muhtasib can even appoint inspectors of investigation who 
would help him in performing his duty. These inspectors must be trustworthy 
person, should be paid from the Bait al-Maal and be immediately dismissed if 
it is known that they are involved in any malpractice themselves.  
Thus, it can be concluded that accountability in general and financial 
accountability in particular has held great importance in both Islamic literature 
and the practice of Islamic state at the time of its inception. Whereas the two 
major sources of Islamic Shariah, namely Quran and Sunnah, provided a 
general framework as well as theoretical foundation for financial 
accountability, it was practically demonstrated by the Prophet peace be upon 
him and his followers since the early Islamic era. Both these steps led to the 
establishment of the institution of hisbah or market supervision in the later 
years. The rulings about hisbah and the duties of muhtasib, the market 
supervisor, were elaborated by Muslim jurists and scholars as we have seen Al-
Mawardi (450 AH) as an example of it. This shows the deep concern of Islam 
with what can be termed in today’s world as “market regulation”. However, we 
have also observed that regulation in Islamic terminology is wider than its 
meaning in conventional term; the former encompassing one’s actions, 
thoughts, and even intentions.  
In his case study, Stilt (2008) reviews the application of law by muhtasib in the 
era of Mamaleek and arrives at some interesting conclusions. He defines 
muhtasib as: “an inspector of the markets and public spaces in general, was a 
legal official charged with “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” and was 
tasked with patrolling public streets, especially in the marketplaces, and 
enforcing laws as he understood them whenever he encountered a violation. 
According to the writer the general population also associated the muhtasib 
with availability and cost of food and “when prices rose and food was 
unavailable, the people often held the muhtasib responsible. In one important 
instance, Stilt (2008) shows how the higher authorities have to intervene in the 
market if the calamity is big enough.  
This was a large-scale crisis, encompassing both major cities and requiring 
grain to be brought from other parts of the sultanate, so it is not surprising that 
the price setting came down from the highest level. An important conclusion 
one can draw from this case study is that the rulings in fiqh may change 
according to circumstances of the people and their sufferings in a specific 
period. In other words, the law was applied in the context of different factors 
working from behind the screen. Thus, the writer firmly concludes that we can 
see that the muhtasib’s actions resulted from a combination of social, 
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economic, and political factors; the potentially applicable laws; and the 
particular personality of the muhtasib. In a nutshell, the institution of hisbah 
has played a vital role in the past in the Muslim societies especially in the 
economic domain. This institution was effective in dealing with the crises’ 
situations and people looked at it in times of food scarcity and other times of 
distress.  
Masalih Mursalah  
Maslaha in simple terms means the benefit that Shariah has given consideration 
for the sake of people’s interest. One specific type of maslaha is where Shariah 
has left a specific matter to be decided by people according to their best 
interest and in line with Shariah guidelines; this type of maslaha is called 
maslahamursalah. Famous examples include the compilation of Quran and the 
order of taking qisas from a group of people for the murder of a single person 
(Al-Aamidi, 1983). There is no doubt that the bulk of modern day financial 
matters can fall under the category of maslahamursalah unless they do not 
violate the spirit of Shariah. The very existence of financial institutions like 
banks etc constitutes great interest for the masses. Therefore, their existence is 
justified on the basis of public interest even if they are not directly found in or 
derived from the sources of Shariah.  
In the context of crisis management, one can see the potential role that might 
be played by maslaha, especially when it is coupled with the legal maxims of 
Shariah. Consider, for instance, the case of deposit insurance or bailouts for 
financial institutions in times of crisis. Based on the notion of public interest, it 
is, at least apparently, in the best interest of masses at large to be protected 
through such mechanisms. Hence, providing these facilities for the sake of 
public confidence and their fund protection seems in line with the notion of 
maslaha. However, there is another angle of this too. As reviewed in the first 
section of this paper, deposit insurance and government bailouts lead to moral 
hazard as well. They can induce bankers take risks beyond their capacity and 
then make the general masses or taxpayers pay for it. To solve this issue, one 
needs to turn towards legal maxims for guidance. One of the maxims in this 
regard states that: averting harm takes precedence over achieving benefit 
(Laldin & al, 2013). With Looked at in a combination with these types of legal 
maxims, the important lesson from the global financial crisis seems to be that 
the issues of deposit insurance and governments’ bailouts needs careful 
deliberation. This is due to the fact that maslaha does not exist on the positive 
side only; on the other side, it is the second name for averting and avoiding the 
harm too.  
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Sadd al-Dharai 
One unique feature of Islamic law is that it proactive in nature; it takes 
precautionary measures to stop a bad or evil from happening. Unlike other 
legal systems where such mechanism may not necessarily be found, Islamic 
law uproots the evil from the scratch and blocks its way from the beginning. 
Take the example of fornication or zina. Islam has prohibited this act and has 
also banned the ways that might lead to the commitment of this act, like free 
mixing up of the two genders and other practices that might ultimately lead to 
fornication. In fact Islamic law has gone one step further by disallowing acts 
that might even be permissible in the first place but they might lead to an evil 
or impermissible result in the long run. This notion is technically known as 
sadd al-dharai or simple blocking the permissible means to prevent unlawful 
things. One example given by scholars is selling weapons to people at the time 
of fitnah or selling wine to someone who is known to be manufacturing from it 
(al-Zuhaily, 1986). 
In contrast to the notion of maslaha or benefit, sadd al-dharai can be utilized 
as a handy tool for policy making in crisis management by not allowing 
something the result of which are known to be detrimental in the long run. This 
is especially true in the context of the global financial crisis. As explained in 
section 1, excessive lending led to credit boom which later on turned into one 
of the worst financial woos for humanity. Based on the principle of sadd al-
dhariah, policy makers in Islamic finance needs to have an eye on this 
principle while deciding and mapping for the long run. If credit creation is 
allowed for Islamic banks, should there be a limit for it or not? Similar 
questions can be asked about derivatives too. No doubt that the existence of 
moral hazard will definitely hamper any reactive measures when times are bad. 
Therefore, sadd al-dhariah has to be utilized as a proactive measure in Islamic 
finance policy making.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY FORMATION IN ISLAMIC 
FINANCE 
The discussion in above two sections leads to a few conclusions that can be put 
into suggestions and recommendation for regulators and policy makers in 
Islamic finance. However, it can be seen that the following points are not 
clearly distinguishable and all of them are closely interconnected. The reason 
to put them separate is to show that they are individually important in terms of 
crisis management and need special focus of the policy makers.  
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Excessive Debt Creation  
It was seen above that excessive lending was the founding step towards the 
financial destruction in 2008. It was in the form of securitization and 
derivatives etc. However, Islamic commercial law has a unique mechanism to 
deal with this issue. This mechanism consists of not only reactive measures but 
is also proactive in nature. In the first place, Islam wants debt not to be taken 
except in the case of real need. Secondly, there is a security measure in the 
form of rahn to ensure safe repayment of debt created. The third layer is that of 
insolvency law which further restricts the options of escape of avoidance of 
debt obligations. In fact the uniqueness of Islamic stance on the issue of debt 
can be easily understood from the fact that the longest verse of the Holy Quran 
deals with securing debt.  
Lastly, non-payment of debt is announced as one of the gravest sins, making 
the borrower morally and religiously obliged to pay it at any cost. Thus, these 
layers after layers provide a natural safety mechanism against excessive risk 
taking that was evident in global financial crisis. The above facts and the 
West’s experience with debt during the global financial crisis should be an 
indication for Islamic finance policy makers to reconsider issues like fractional 
banking reserve system that sometimes makes debt creation possible to 
unlimited extent. It also calls for an insolvency regime that clearly 
distinguished the rights and obligations of the parties to financial markets in 
the case of insolvency, bankruptcy and financial distress. Such a regime, 
however, is missing currently and it is not clear what will happen in case the 
Islamic finance industry faces a crisis at mass level.   
Legal Personality and Limited Liability 
As explained above, it is the modern principle of limited liability that lays at 
the heart of this whole debate since this principle leads to all other moral 
hazard problems. Once again, Islam has addressed the issue explicitly, for 
instance, in the form of legal maxims like: “Benefit goes with liability and 
Liability accompanies gain” (Laldin & al, 2013). Apparently, the maxims 
indicate the liability cannot be limited if the gain is unlimited. This is also 
asserted by Usmani who accepted the notion of legal personality and limited 
liability for large public corporations only due to necessity. However, many of 
the contemporary scholars defend the acceptance of these principles on 
different grounds that sound reasonable.  
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But one cannot forget the role played by moral hazard during the crisis which 
was the direct outcome of limiting liability. It was elaborated above that legal 
personality and limited liability have been questioned in the West since the 
time of Adam Smith. It is also accepted that both these principles are required 
for modern day corporations to work. But it does not mean that precautionary 
steps are not available to solve, or at least minimize, the negative impact of 
these. Consider some suggestions by Schluter (2000) to address this issue. 
Firstly, the shareholders may be made liable for ten percent of the company’s 
debt if insolvency happens. Under this principle, the shareholders would be 
liable according to their respective shares in the company and not according to 
their personal wealth; i.e. the largest and not the wealthiest should be liable. 
Secondly, company law could also be changed to move away from this 
principle.  
Risk Taking and Moral Hazard  
If risk is taken with the knowledge that its consequences will be born by other 
parties, it has no limits as its destruction can be unlimited. Many of these moral 
hazards involve increased risk-taking: if I can take risks that you have to bear, 
then I may as well take them; but if I have to bear the consequences of my own 
risky actions, I will act more responsibly. Thus, inadequate control of moral 
hazards often leads to socially excessive risk-taking and excessive risk-taking 
is certainly a recurring theme in the current financial crisis (Dowd, 2009). 
Risk taking can come in numerous forms and risk that is natural to the business 
and finance environment is acceptable, rather essential, to be taken and even 
mitigated. But risk creation in the form of toxic instruments is highly 
questionable. These toxic instruments may produce good results in the short-
run, but their long term damaging effect is visible even today after years of the 
global financial crisis. Considering the legal maxim, averting harm takes 
precedence over achieving benefit (Laldin & al, 2013), toxic risky instruments 
need to be reconsidered. Shariah compliant derivatives etc. need to be 
scrutinized and controlled before they turn into something uncontrollable. 
Perhaps the small harm caused by the absence of these instruments is far better 
than the damages it caused during the global financial crisis. 
It is only a matter of time to realize it. An excellent example of risk taking is 
provided by Al-Mawardi (450 AH) states that the muhtasib must prevent ship-
owners from carrying a load which exceeds the capacity of the ship, lest it 
should lead to its sinking; likewise, he should stop them sailing when strong 
winds are blowing. The writer understood that the ship owners, in their quest 
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for more profit, may put the money of other people at stake and, therefore, it is 
the responsibility of muhtasib, the regulator, to control such behavior.  
Governments’ Bailouts  
Government bailout to the troubled institutions is a very serious issue in crisis 
management. It is often argued that bailing out large financial institutions in 
crises is something not avoidable; if not provided, the whole system can 
collapse. However, this may not be the case and it is sometimes wise not to 
make taxpayer suffer for the sake of too big to fail. Ayotte and Skeel (2009) 
provide the example Lehman Brothers collapse and AIG bailout to prove that 
bailing out and letting fall may produce the same results which shows that 
insolvency is not always a bad option.  
Table 1. Comparative Statistics Index between Lehman Brother and AIG 
Index Lehman Brothers AIG 
12 Sep 15 Sep Change 16 Sep 17 Sep Change 
S&P 500 1251.7 1192.7 -4.71% 1213.6 1156.39 -4.71% 
Volatility (VIX) 25.66 31.7 23.54% 30.3 36.22 19.54% 
TED Spread 1.35 2.01 0.66 2.19 3.02 0.84 
13-weeks treasury bill 1.46 0.81 -0.65 0.86 0.02 -0.84 
Source: Ayotte and Skeel (2009). 
What is demonstrated from these numbers is that contrary to the expectations 
from AIG bailouts, the response from the market was not so positive. On the 
one hand, this shows how if the confidence is lost, it is difficult to restore it 
especially in times of crisis. On the other hand, it is evident that bankruptcy has 
to be kept open as an option in times of need.  
Deposit Insurance  
It is suggested that the policy makers in Islamic finance should reconsider the 
deposit insurance. It is the root cause of moral hazard in conventional finance 
and has been questioned in conventional finance too. If the investors who fund 
a financial institution by lending money or buying stock anticipate that the firm 
will be rescued if it runs into trouble, they may extend funding beyond what 
they would extend otherwise (Ayotte and Skeel, 2009). It has also been argued 
that deposit insurance strongly affect market discipline negatively by making 
depositors indifferent towards the performance of banks. Consequently, banks 
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are induced to take risk that is not suitable at all; the depositors will not bother 
the banks’ risk taking as long as they are sure about their deposits.  
Even if not abolished, its mechanism should be such that moral hazard is 
avoided as much as possible. One suggestion given in the wake of recent crisis 
is that deposit insurance should be dependent on two factors: the size of the 
financial institution and the risk it takes. These steps will make financial 
institutions make responsive towards this issue and make lees risky investment, 
i.e. risk that they can pay for first.  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The global financial crisis resulted in great destruction and the world has not 
yet recovered from it. It is not known how much time it takes the finance world 
to stand back on its feet again after the collapse. However, there is something 
positive that the crisis gave the world; it is the regulatory and policy lessons 
that can be derived from it. Although Islamic finance was quite immune to the 
global crisis as compared to its conventional peer, concerns still exist. It is time 
that Islamic finance industry learns from the financial woes of the rest of the 
world. In fact the world is already changing its financial landscape with heavy 
reforms and stricter regulations like the new Basel requirements etc. However, 
the policy makers of Islamic finance should understand that it is one thing to 
fight against evil; it is absolutely different to curb the very roots of the evil.  
The West may succeed in its struggle but its success will be temporary only. If 
crisis management policy for Islamic finance is based on the principles 
elaborated in this paper like hisbah, maslaha, and sadd al-dhariah, it is hoped 
that the solutions will be everlasting. In line with the nature of Islamic law in 
general, such a policy has to be proactive and address the relevant issues before 
they occur, instead of being reactive and just wait for a crisis in Islamic finance 
industry to happen first and then think of solutions. It is time for the industry 
and the policy makers of Islamic finance to revisit their existing strategies and 
come up with solutions that comply with the spirit of Shariah and can become 
a role model for the rest of the world.  
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